Historic Preservation Grants To Houses Of Workship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism by Lupu, Ira C & Tuttle, Robert W
Boston College Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 5 Shifting Into Neutral? Emerging Perspectives
On The Separation Of Church And State
Article 5
9-1-2002
Historic Preservation Grants To Houses Of
Workship: A Case Study in the Survival of
Separationism
Ira C. Lupu
Robert W. Tuttle
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants To Houses Of Workship: A Case Study in
the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C.L. Rev. 1139 (2002), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol43/iss5/5
HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS TO
HOUSES OF WORSHIP: A CASE STUDY IN
THE SURVIVAL OF SEPARATIONISMt
IRA C. LUPU*
ROBERT W. TUTPLE **
Abstract: Many states have historic preservation regulations that, as
applied to properties owned by religious entities, have been challenged
on free exercise grounds. Historic preservation programs, however, also
include government grants for preservation efforts, and no court has
yet been asked to rule on the permissibility of such grants. This Article
analyzes the existing Supreme Court precedent on state financial
support for the construction or preservation of places of worship or
religious teaching. After briefly reviewing the movement from Separ-
ationists to Neutralism, this Article collects and appraises materials on
historic preservation, which reveal a remarkable degree of disparity in
preservation policies, as various levels of government struggle with
changes in the relevant law. This Article concludes by invoking a
principle of Religion Clause symmetry—what the government may
regulate it may also subsidize—and by suggesting that the religion-
specific line between permissible and impermissible subsidy (and reg-
ulation) should be drawn between the exteriors and interiors of houses
of worship.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between government and places of worship pre-
sents questions as old as the Republic. Although these questions arise .
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in many contexts, } our primary focus is on the problem of historic
preservation. Courts have decided a number of important cases about
the rights of religious institutions to resist historical landmarking and
the strict governmental controls over property that accompany that
status. 2 Indeed, City of Boerne v. Flores,3 the 1997 case in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States invalidated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as applied to the states, arose in the context of pre-
cisely such a dispute.
Our attention, however, will be on the expenditure side of the
historic preservation question—to what extent may the state make
grants and loans to assist in the historic preservation of buildings that
are subject to mandatory preservation and are devoted to religious
use?4 To our knowledge, there are no judicial decisions on this sub-
ject,5 although state administrative officers face the question regularly.
True Separationists oppose both the landmarking of worship sites and
the payment of grants to owners of landmarked worship sites. Com-
mitted Neutralists, however, favor both the regulation and the support
of landrnarked worship sites—precisely to the same extent and on the
1 See, e.g., C. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Relig-
ious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998) (addressing the resolution of factional dis-
putes within faith communities over the ownership and control of property); Robert W.
Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L.
Rev. 861 (2000) (zoning decisions concerning land use by religious institutions). For a
discussion of emergency assistance to religious property that has been damaged in disas-
ters, see infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; and for government certification of the
tax-exempt character of bonds whose proceeds will be used for construction of buildings
with some religious character, see infra note 41 and accompanying text. See also Steele v.
Indust. Dev. Bd., 301 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2002).
2 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990);
E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. State, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1008
(2001); First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1992). We discuss these cases
infra Part IIIA. See also Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564
N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
3 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4
 The only secondary materials we have located on this subject are Louis it Cohen, Re-
ligious Freedoms: Historic Preservation Grants and the Establishment Clause, ALI-ABA Course of
Study Materials: Historic Preservation Law (Oct. 2001); Dina A. Keever, Note, Public Funds
and the Historical Preservation of Churches: Preserving History or Advancing Religion?, 21 FLA. ST .
U. L. Rev. 1327 (1994).
5 The one that comes closest is Frohliger u Richardson, 218 P. 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1923), a 1923 California decision on the permissibility of state financial support for pre-
serving the San Diego Mission. That case did not involve the prospect of a mandatory
preservation scheme, pursuant to which the Mission's owners would have obligations to
preserve the structure unchanged, being imposed upon the mission.
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same terms that other structures are regulated and supported. 6 And
there of course may be other, less symmetrical formulations that
should be open for consideration.?
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I highlights themes in the
historical and judicial legacy of American Separationism, particularly
as they apply to expenditures in support of the physical structures of
religious entities. Part II sketches the rise of the Neutrality principle
and the decline—still incomplete—of the Separationist paradigm
over the past twenty years. The Article's centerpiece, Part III, turns to
the particulars of historic preservation. Part III.A addresses the strug-
gle over the question of regulatory exemptions, for structures devoted
to religious use, from historic preservation laws. Part III.B introduces
an intriguing pair of dueling legal opinions, from prominent execu-
tive branch lawyers, on the question of the constitutional permissibil-
ity of government grants for the historic preservation of religious
structures. Part IILC describes in detail the current patterns, policies,
and practices of federal and state government with respect to
financial support for historic preservation of such structures, and
contrasts these patterns of financial support with other current gov-
ernment programs through which government may support
financially the physical structures owned by religious entities. Finally,
Part IV appraises the details unpacked earlier in light of the larger,
contemporary struggle between advocates of Separationism and Neu-
tralism to define the dominant Religion Clause paradigm.
6
 We developed at length the concepts of Separationism and Neutralism in Ira C.
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order,
47 Viti. L. REV. 37 (2002).
1
 Those whom we call Religionists, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 48, systematically
favor whatever will help religious institutions; in this context, that would involve preserva-
tion grants for religious institutions without preservation regulations and orders. Those
whom we call Secularists, see id, at 48-49, systematically disfavor whatever would help such
institutions; here, that would involve making them subject to coercive regulation while
barring them from grants. We do not think a principled account of the Religion Clauses
can be attached to either of these views. As we explain in more detail at infra notes 42-44
and accompanying text, we believe that Religion Clause symmetry—pursuant to which
constitutional limits on government interference with religion map precisely onto the
limits of government sponsorship of religion—is a necessary condition of a persuasive
account of the Religion Clauses.
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I. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES —THE
SEPARATIONIST LEGACY
As all students of Religion Clause history know, James Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 8 is the most
important statement of the American attitude toward church-state
relations in the early days of the Republic. Its publication in 1784, and
its success in turning the political tide in Virginia just three years be-
fore the Philadelphia Convention (from which the new federal Con-
stitution was to emerge), marked a tectonic shift in the structure of
'argumentation in America on state support for religion. 9 The Memo-
rial and Remonstrance had as its target a particular religious assessment
bill that was designed to appropriate money for Christian sects in Vir-
ginia. Each of those sects, upon receiving the funds allocated to it by
taxpayer designation, would have been obliged to spend them on "a
provision for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel ... or to providing
places of divine worship."1° Madison's objections to the bill won the
day; it was defeated, and in its stead the Virginia Assembly enacted
Jefferson's Bill for Religious Liberty, which provided in part "W hat no
man shall be compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever ... ."11
There is considerable debate over the extent to which this Vir-
ginia history should be taken as the measure of meaning for the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment." Whatever the right an-
swer to that question may be, however, there can be no doubt that the
Founding Generation saw compulsory taxation to pay for the salary of
clergy, and the construction of houses of worship, as a constitutional
problem of the highest magnitude.
It would take more than one hundred years before the Supreme
Court would confront issues of government financial support for
8
 The Memorial and Remonstrance is set out as an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent
in Everson u Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
9
 The primary contribution of the Memorial and Remonstrance was its focus on the ad-
vantages to government, as well as to religion, that would ensue from extensive church-
state separation. For a thorough analysis of the distinctive contribution of the Memorial and
Remonstrance and an analysis of the ways its lessons might inform the contemporary debate
about school vouchers, see Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Ques-
tions from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Coarreu. L. FtEv. 783 (2002).
° Everson, 330 U.S. at 74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The proposed assessment bill per-
mitted Quakers and Mennonites to promote their mode of worship as they saw fit, pre-
sumably because neither sect had clergy or houses of worship.
" Id. at 13.
12 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffive, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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physical structures associated with religious institutions. 1n1899, in
Bradfield u Roberts," the Court rejected an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to a federal appropriation for a hospital building, to be devoted
exclusively to the medical care of those with contagious disease, at a
medical facility controlled by the Roman Catholic church. The Court
focused on the building's purposes, not the identity of the owner, and
ruled that the secularity of those purposes precluded the expenditure
from being an establishment of religion.
Over seventy years later, at a moment of apex for the Separation-
ist paradigm, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of Bradfield
in Tilton v. Richardson." Tilton upheld a series of federal construction
grants, authorized by the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, to
church-affiliated colleges and universities. The grants supported con-
struction of libraries, a language laboratory, and buildings for science,
and music and art. The Act expressly excluded "any facility used or to
be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or
... any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in connection
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity
." A four Justice plurality, augmented by Justice White's concur-
rence, concluded that the statute authorized, and the Constitution
did not forbid, grants to church-affiliated institutions. The constitu-
tional reasoning of the plurality depended heavily on the fact that the
schools that had received the grants had not been shown to be "per-
vasively sectarian" and had maintained the federally supported build-
ings in a scrupulously secular fashion. Moreover, the plurality con-
cluded that the monitoring required to insure that the schools
complied with the secular use restrictions would not lead to forbidden
entanglements between the state and religiously affiliated institu-
tions.15
The Court in Tilton was unanimous, however, in striking down
one portion of the federal scheme. As originally enacted, the program
had limited to twenty years the "secular use" restriction on federally
subsidized buildings. The expiration of the twenty-year period would
have permitted the school to make sectarian uses of the building, and
13 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
14 403 U.S. 672 (1971). The Court decided Tilton on the same day in 1971 as Lemon u
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
13 In Lemon, by contrast, the Court found that the pervasively sectarian character of
most of the aided elementary and secondary schools made it impossible to monitor the
secularity of the expenditures without the entanglement becoming constitutionally exces-
sive. See generally 403 U.S. 602.
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this, everyone on the Court agreed, 1° would involve the government
in impermissibly advancing religion. Accordingly, the Court held that
the restriction must, by force of constitutional requirement, extend
for the life of the building.
A few years later, in Hunt u McNair," the Court extended the
"secular use" principle of Bradfield and Tilton to actions of a state issu-
ing revenue bonds, as part of a religion-neutral program, for the pur-
pose of financing capital improvements at the Baptist College of
Charleston. As in Tilton, the program included explicit restrictions on
the use of bond-financed structures; all uses for sectarian instruction
or worship were forbidden. Moreover, the bond scheme did not in-
volve any direct transfer of government funds to the aided institution.
The funds all came from private investors, assured of tax-favorable
treatment by the state's participation in the scheme. In a six-to-three
ruling, the Court held that such a scheme did not have the purpose
or primary effect of advancing religion, nor did it involve the state in
excessive monitoring of the religious affairs of the school.
Bradfield, Tilton, and Hunt all approved of state support for secu-
lar uses of wholly secular structures at religiously controlled institu-
tions. None of the three, however, involved the question of permissi-
bility of state support for buildings devoted to worship and sectarian
teaching. With respect to that question, which resides in greater prox-
imity to the problem of the Virginia Assessment, there is but one key
Supreme Court decision—Committee for Public Education u Nyquist, 18
also decided in the midst of Separationism's fullest flowering.
These days, Nyquist is best known as the decision at the center of
the controversy over school vouchers,19 because the case involved
grants and so-called "tuition tax credits" for the benefit of parents
16 See generally id.
17 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
18 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
19 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2472 (2002) (discussing Nyquist). The
Nyquist decision provided the central focus of a number of the briefs filed in the Supreme
Court in the Zelman case. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents Doris Simmons-Harris, et al., 122
S. Ct. 2460 (2000) (00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), reprinted in 2000 U.S. Briefs 1751 (invok-
ing Nyquist as authority for upholding the decision of the lower courts). But see, e.g., Brief
for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *10, 122 S. Ct. 2460
(2000) (00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), reprinted in 2000 U.S. Briefs 1751 (distinguishing
Nyquist and questioning its continued authority). For our views on the Zelman problem, see
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers
and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & Pot.. (forthcoming 2002). Whatever doubt Zelman
casts on the continued validity of Nyquist, that doubt does not extend to the portion of
Nyquist dealing with "maintenance and repair" grants. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768.
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whose children attended private schools, sectarian or otherwise. An-
other feature of the legislation invalidated in Nyquist, however, in-
volved "maintenance and .repair" grants to nonpublic schools, de-
signed to aid them in the upkeep of their physical facilities. The state
calculated the amount of these grants on a per pupil basis, subject to
a maximum based upon comparable expenditures in the public
school system, and did not impose any "secular use" restriction upon
the grants.
By a vote of eight-to-one,2° the Supreme Court struck down the
grants for "maintenance and repair." The central portion of its discus-
sion is as follows:
No attempt is made to restrict payments to those expendi-
tures used exclusively for secular purposes, nor do we think
it possible within the context of these religion-oriented insti-
tutions to impose such restrictions. Nothing in the statute,
for instance, bars a qualifying school from paying out of state
funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school
chapel, or the cost of renovating classrooms in which relig-
ion is taught, or the cost of heating and lighting those same
facilities. Absent appropriate restrictions on [such] expendi-
tures, it simply cannot be denied that [these grants have] a
primary effect that advances religion in that [they] subsi-
dize[] directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary
and secondary schools. 21
Moreover, after invoking that portion of Tilton which invalidated
the complete reversion of federally financed buildings, after twenty
years, to the unrestricted use of religiously affiliated colleges, the Ny-
quist Court concluded this portion of its opinion with a categorical
assertion that hearkened back to the controversy over the Virginia
Assessment. "If the State may not erect buildings in which religious
activities are to take place," Justice Powell wrote, "it may not maintain
such buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair."22
" Only justice White dissented from this portion of the Court's opinion, and he did so
with virtually no elaboration of his reasons. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 820 (White, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 413 U.S. at 774.
22
 Id. at 777 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 11: 'The imposition of taxes to pay ministers'
salaries and to build and maintain churches and church property aroused their indigna-
tion. It was these feelings which found expression in [the Establishment Clause of] the
First Amendment.").
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Nyquist thus stands as the singular and unchallenged Supreme
Court precedent on the issue of state support for structures whose
uses include worship or religious instruction. Among its central prem-
ises, of course, is that religious elementary and secondary schools are
likely to be "pervasively sectarian," so that any unrestricted transfers to
their operations will have a forbidden "primary effect" of advancing
religion. However controversial it may be today to categorize such
schools in this way, 23 there can be little doubt of the sectarian charac-
ter of buildings devoted exclusively to worship. If such structures are
constitutionally distinctive, as the Court in Nyquist assumed and as our
constitutional history suggests, government grants to preserve them
seem entirely impermissible.
II. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD NEUTRALISM
In the Separationist world described in Part 1, grants for the
preservation of structures devoted to worship would seem impossible
to sustain constitutionally. Over the past twenty years, however, the
grip of Separationism on the law of the Religion Clauses has declined,
and the paradigm of Neutralism has ascended. Has this trend
changed the landscape sufficiently to warrant a different outcome on
the permissibility of such grants?
The shift to Neutralism has had three major components, only
one of which bears directly on the issue of historic preservation
grants. First, for the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has been
vigorously enforcing rights of equal access to various public fora for
religious causes and speakers. This line of cases, starting with Widmar
v. Vincent 24
 in 1981 and running through Good News Club v. Milford
Central School 25 in 2001, represents a repudiation of an extreme ver-
sion of Separationism, in which private religious speech is compulso-
" The opinions in Mitchell u Helms, 530 U.S. '793 (2000), cast substantial doubt on the
continuing vitality of the idea that "pervasively sectarian" institutions are under special
disabilities in the receipt of government benefits. A four-Justice plurality in Mitchell explic-
itly repudiates the concept, id. at 827-30 (plurality opinion), and the concurring opinion
by Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, id. at 836-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
does not rely upon it and reaches a result inconsistent with it. See also Columbia Union
Coll. v. Clarke, 527 U.S. 1013,1013-15 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari, and arguing for reconsideration of the concept of "pervasively sectarian" institu-
tions).
24
 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
25 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001); see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993).
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rily excluded from publicly controlled space. This entire development
arose out of the overreaction of local officials to the School Prayer
Cases;26
 although those decisions had involved only situations of
officially sponsored worship in public schools, some local govern-
ments had erroneously extended the concerns of the School Prayer
Cases to wholly private speech in public settings. Nevertheless, the
recent decisions involving prayer at public school sporting events 27
and commencements,28
 when measured against the backdrop of the
equal access decisions of the past two decades, demonstrate that Neu-
tralism extends to private speech in public fora but does not extend to
government sponsored speech. 29
 When government speaks, or private
parties speak in contexts in which the message is attributable to the
government, some version of Separationism still controls."
The second major development in the direction of Neutralism
appeared in 1990, in the form of the Supreme Court's surprisingly
broad decision in Employment Division v. Smith. 3' Smith held that courts
should no longer apply the compelling interest test to claims of ex-
emption, based upon the Free Exercise Clause, from religion-neutral,
general laws. Although the pre-Smith law had not been nearly so relig-
ion-friendly as the opponents of Smith would have us believe," the
rhetorical structure of Free Exercise doctrine had indeed been
marked by a Separationist character; prior to Smith, claims that gen-
eral legal norms burdened religiously motivated choices triggered an
inquiry that was not similarly triggered by burdens on choices moti-
vated by nonreligious reasons. Smith's Neutralist move, therefore, was
to remit religion-based claims against general laws to precisely the
same status as claims based on other reasons for desiring to be free of
" Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
" Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
2 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
23
 This proposition is true outside of public schools as well as inside of them. The en-
tire question of impermissible government "endorsement" of religion is bound up with the
idea that the state may not be neutral between religious and nonreligious messages in the
communication of its own views. Compare County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989), with Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
3° See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 316 (public school may not sponsor student-
uttered prayer over public address system at high school football game). For an important
recent effort to grapple with the problem of religious utterances by students in various
public school contexts, see Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We
Missing Somethingr, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147 (2002).
31 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
" Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 176-85 (1995).
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such laws. If such laws violated other constitutional protections—free
speech, or privacy, for example—courts would strike them. If, how-
ever, the laws did not target religion by singling it out for disfavored
treatment,55 Free Exercise norms would not rescue religious adher-
ents from the legal obligation to comply. Smith of course bears heavily
on the question of exemption of religious institutions from the regu-
latory regime associated with historic preservation laws, but does not
speak to the constitutionality of historic preservation grants to such
institutions.
The third, and for our purposes most relevant, shift in the direc-
tion of Neutralism arises from recent cases involving government as-
sistance to private schools, including sectarian ones. In 1997, in Agos-
tini v. Felton,34 and in 2000, in Mitchell v. Helms,35 the Supreme Court
effectively repudiated the concept that all assistance to "pervasively
sectarian" institutions was constitutionally forbidden. Agostini upheld
the inclusion of sectarian schools in a federal program which pro-
vided remedial instruction, by teachers who are public employees, to
students attending schools in educationally deprived areas. 56 Mitchell,
which also involved a religion-neutral federal program, upheld the
transfer of educational materials and equipment, including computer
hardware and software, to sectarian schools. In both Agostini and
Mitchell, the statute required that the goods and services transferred
be limited to those of a secular character.
The Court plurality in Mitchell went furthest in its rejection of the
doctrinal trappings and underlying premises of Separationism. It ex-
plicitly discarded the notion of "pervasive sectarianism,"" condemn-
ing it as anti-Catholic in its origins, disturbing in the incentives it cre-
ated for religious entities to dilute their faith, and unconstitutionally
intrusive in the structure of adjudication it produced. Moreover, the
Mitchell plurality made the full plunge toward Establishment Clause
Neutralism in cases in which government transfers are challenged; so
long as the category of aided institutions is religion-neutral, and the
SS For the rare but important case in which a particular sect had been so targeted, see
Church of the Luhumi Babalu Aye, Inc. u Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
" 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
S5 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
56 Perhaps because public employees were doing the teaching, the Court in Agostini
was not concerned that the remedial program would effectively lend support to sectarian
instruction, in other parts of the curriculum. Without question, the remedial program
benefited schools that seemed to fit earlier descriptions of "pervasively sectarian institu-
tions." See 521 U.S. at 223-25.
37 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829 (plurality opinion).
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aided program does not result in religious indoctrination for which
government is responsible, the Mitchell plurality would permit trans-
fers to a broad category of nonprofit institutions, including the most
sectarian among them. One would think, therefore, that the Mitchell
plurality would approve of historic preservation grants to houses of
worship, so long as those eligible for grants were a larger, religion-
neutral set of landmarked properties.
The Mitchell plurality drew the votes of four Justices. Three other
members of the Court adhered to traditional Separationist views, and
dissented in both Agostini and Mitchell, on the grounds that the aid
schemes advanced religion, entangled the government with religion,
or both." Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer, however, concurring
in Mitchell, took the view that neither the strong Neutralist view nor
the strong Separationist view were constitutionally sound. The
O'Connor-Breyer opinion did not defend the doctrine which ex-
cluded "pervasively sectarian" entities from state assistance, and in any
event the results in Mitchell and Agostini cannot be squared with that
doctrine. On the more refined question of precisely what sort of aid
to sectarian entities is permissible, however, the O'Connor-Breyer view
is that the Constitution forbids the use of such aid for religious in-
struction or activity."
The O'Connor-Breyer approach, which permits aid to thoroughly
sectarian institutions but not to their sectarian activities, for the mo-
ment controls the outcome in the Supreme Court. However plausible
or correct their concurrence may be for programs of aid to sectarian
schools, their view represents an incomplete shift from the paradigm
of Separationism to that of Neutrality. Religious instruction, alone
among subjects of pedagogy, remains off limits to government sup-
port. This rule, in turn, raises very difficult questions when the state
assistance takes the form of payment for bricks and mortar, or any
other good which cannot be segregated into religious and secular
" Id. at 867-913 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Stevens, B., dissenting); Agostini, 521
U.S. at 255-60 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
39 In Zelman n Simmons-Harris, justice Breyer adhered to this view even in cases of indi-
rect voucher financing. See 122 S. Ct. 2460,2502-08 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor joined the Court opinion, which rejected this view in cases of such financing.
See id. at 2465-68. Under the Mitchell concurrence the difficult question is how to distin-
guish and segregate religious from secular uses when the two are intertwined. Consider,
for example, a class focused on reading skills that uses the Bible as its text. May the gov-
ernment regard that activity as secular., and pay for the Bibles and/or the costs of labor
engaged in the instruction?
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components.° May the state pay for the pro rata secular share of a
building used for both secular and sectarian purposes? If not, should
the question be framed in terms of the building's primary use? Or
should religious uses, even if de mininiis, disqualify a structure from
any and all government assistance in its maintenance and preserva-
tion? The shift, led by Justices O'Connor and Breyer, from an institu-
tional focus to a more surgically precise activity-based focus, leaves
such questions unanswered.41
40 The recent announcement by Secretary Martinez of the U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) that the Department is now willing to finance physi-
cal improvements of structures in which religious worship may accompany social services
highlights the crucial relevance of the questions we address for charitable choice policy as
well for issues of historic preservation. See Associated Press, Shelter told it can seek grant with-
out dropping prayer (Mar. 15, 2002), available at AP J8542 rn sdsd-SD-Homeless-Grant, Bjt,
0429 (describing a statement from Secretary Martinez that city officials may consider giv-
ing a federally financed community development grant for new doors, windows, and a new
floor, to St. Francis House, a homeless shelter owned by the Catholic diocese of Sioux
Falls, SD, despite the fact that prayers are offered before the evening meal in the shelter)
(copy on file with the authors); see also Tamara Lytle, Martinez Backs Homeless Shelter's Meal-
time Prayers, THE OR/ANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2002, at Al.
41 The uncertainty inherent in the O'Connor-Breyer approach surfaces in two recent
decisions, the district court's in Steele u Industrial Development Board, 117 F. Supp. 2d 693
(M.D. Tenn. 2000), rev'd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16375 (6th Cir. 2000), and Virginia College
Building Authority u Lynn , 538 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2000). Both cases involved the use of state
revenue bonds to finance the construction of buildings owned by religious institutions,
David Lipscomb University in Steele, and Regent University in Lynn. The financing schemes
challenged in these two cases were indistinguishable from the one at issue in Hunt u
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); what differed was the nature of the universities benefited by
the programs. In Steele and Lynn, each court found that the university in question was
"pervasively sectarian." Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 706-16; Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 697-98. Both
courts went on to say, however, that under Agostini, Mitchell, and other recent Supreme
Court decisions the "pervasively sectarian" label proves neither dispositive nor irrelevant
The O'Connor-Breyer approach requires a closer analysis of the uses of the tax-supported
funds. Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 706-07, 721-30; Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 637-39.
Despite this shared framework, the Steele and Lynn cases demonstrate the wide range
of interpretations possible under the O'Connor-Breyer approach. In Steele, the district
court found that recent Establishment Clause decisions by the Supreme Court still require
the presence of "safeguards implemented to ensure that the aid will support only the secu-
lar functions of the institutions." 117 F. Supp. 2d at 705. Although the loan agreement
between Lipscomb University and the Industrial Development Board prohibited the uni-
versity from using structures built with loan proceeds for sectarian worship or instruction,
this contractual limitation fell short of minimum constitutional requirements in two ways.
td at 727. First, the board delegated its enforcement power—and the monitoring function
presupposed by the enforcement power—to the bank that provided the source of Lip-
scomb's loans, and then made exercise of that power discretionary. Id. at 728-29. Second,
the actual use of loan funds indicated no effort to segregate their use from sectarian in-
struction. The loan proceeds were used to build and furnish a library dominated by relig-
ious literature, with a collection that focused heavily on the university's denomination.
Although the court found that the proportionate emphasis of the library itself suggested a
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As suggested by the inclusion of equal access claims, Free Exer-
cise developments, and Establishment Clause decisions in our discus-
sion of the trend from Separationism toward Neutralism, this move-
ment is not narrowly clause-bound. These developments extend to
matters involving state-imposed burdens upon religion as well as state-
conferred benefits upon it; as such, they highlight the theme of sym-
metry between the Religion Clauses as a necessary element of any vi-
able theory of religion's constitutional status. Full-fledged Neutralism,
like some aggressive versions of Separationism, is indeed symmetrical,
but both are marred by overstatement. 42
 Strong Separationism treats
virtually all matters pertaining to state interaction with religion as
constitutionally distinctive, while strong Neutralism tries to eradicate
the legal distinctiveness of all such matters.
In our view, the constitutionally distinctive character of religion is
real but limited, and derives from a theory of the secular state. The
Religion Clauses mark a jurisdictional limitation on state power. The
government is limited to temporal matters and may not intrude or
failure to ensure the expenditure of funds on nonsectarian purposes, the problem was
compounded by the availability of loan funds to purchase texts, including religious materi-
als, for the library. Id. at 729-31. Because the Industrial Development Board failed to en-
sure that tax-supported funds would be used only for secular purposes, the court enjoined
any further loans to Lipscomb University. Id. at 734-35. On August 14, 2002, just as this
Article was going to press, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court decision in Steele. The Sixth Circuit ruled, two-to-one, that the aid in ques-
tion in Steele did not violate the Establishment Clause because the aid was indirect, and was
offered to a religion-neutral class of beneficiaries. The dissent argued that the aid was di-
rect, that David Lipscomb University was "pervasively sectarian," and that the aid therefore
violated the Clause.
In Lynn, however, the Virginia Supreme Court emphasized a different element of the
O'Connor-Breyer approach, the status of "genuinely independent chokes" of private ac-
tors in breaking the link between state programs and religious activities. 538 S.E.2d at 698.
Where government funds reach religious entities through free private choices, '`endorse-
ment of the religious message is reasonably attributed to the individuals who select the
path of the aid," not the government. Mitchell 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
quoted in Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 699. Because the benefit of the bond program depended
entirely on the decision of individual investors to purchase Regent University's bonds, and
the bond program was available to a wide range of nonprofit educational institutions, the
Lynn court found no constitutional violation in a pervasively sectarian institution's partici-
pation in such a financing scheme. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 698-99. The court went on to say,
however, that Regent's proposed use of the bond funds for its Divinity School was imper-
missible, but not because of the Establishment Clause. Instead, such financing would vio-
late the terms of the Virginia Educational Facilities Authority Act and the Virginia Consti-
tution's education clause. Id. at 699.
42
 Much of our argument in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, is devoted to exposing the
inadequacies of asymmetrical versions of Separationism and Neutralism, and to explaining
why symmetrical but overly muscular accounts of Separationism and Neut•alissn are un-
wise.
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otherwise assert its interest in the realm of the sacred, 43 a realm that
includes worship practices. Government should not author, coerce,
regulate, promote, or subsidize worship.
Armed with this substantive view of the boundary of state compe-
tence, we strongly believe that it should be applied symmetrically to
both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. What
the government may not regulate, it may not support financially, be-
cause financial support inevitably involves some measure of regulatory
control. That the control accompanying state financial assistance may
be seen as "voluntary" from the perspective of religious institutions
should not alter the constitutionally required outcome. Because the
boundaries required by the Establishment Clause are jurisdictional,
not "rights-based," parties cannot waive them or in any other way con-
sent to their removal.'"
Symmetry of course works in both directions, defining the scope
of the permissible as well as the forbidden. What the government may
regulate, it may also subsidize. The precise content of the boundary
between the secular, which should be open to both regulation and
support, and the religiously distinctive, which should be open to nei-
ther, must be worked out in particular legal contexts. The remainder
of this piece seeks to illuminate that process of analysis and judgment
in the context of historic preservation of houses of worship.
III. HISTORIC PRESERVATION OF RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES
The concepts of jurisdictional limitation and Religion Clause
symmetry, developed at the end of Part II, will facilitate the discussion
of the constitutional appropriateness of government grants for the
historic preservation of houses of worship. In the discussion that fol-
lows, we describe the extent to which houses of worship are exempt
from the regulations that control landmarked structures, and proceed
through a dramatic juxtaposition of dueling opinion letters from
prominent public officials on the subject of preservation grants to
houses of worship. We then describe the surprising array of policies
and practices of governments, federal and state, with respect to such
See id, at 83-84; see also Carl Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separa-
tianism and the Establishment Clause, 13 Nom DAstz .J.L. ETHICS & Pus. POL'Y 285, 292-
300, 304-11 (1999) (analyzing the Establishment Clause as a restriction on government
intrusion into "inherently religious matters").
44 For additional elaboration of the jurisdictional character of the Religion Clauses,
see Carl Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations and
Ramifications, in Symposium, The End of Separatism, 18 J.L. & Pot- (forthcoming 2002).
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grants. We conclude in Part IV with suggestions about where to draw a
substantively sound and Religion Clause-symmetrical boundary be-
tween permissible and impermissible state involvement in the historic
preservation of houses of worship.
A. The Problem of Regulation
Unsurprisingly, the process of government-mandated historic
preservation of structures and neighborhoods has attracted a substan-
tial amount of attention,45
 especially as applied to structures owned by
religious entities and used for worship. The process has the potential
to be coercive and to create significant financial hardship. In the case
of houses of worship, the preservation process can limit the freedom
of a religious community to expand its ability to hold worshipers; 46
alter its structure for economic, 47
 aesthetic, or liturgical48
 reasons; or,
in the most extreme case, reconfigure its interior worship space. 49
Courts have varied widely in their approaches to the questions
raised by application of historic preservation ordinances to religious
properties, and the issues have been complicated significantly by the
45
 At the federal level, comprehensive efforts to preserve historic structures and
neighborhoods trace back to the National Historic Preservation Act, enacted in 1966. 16
U.S.C. § 470 (2000). The Act established the National Register of Historic Places and cre-
ated a mechanism for awarding grants to owners of historic properties and to state historic
preservation offices. The Act did not provide a legal basis for "landmarking" historic prop-
erties without their owners' consent. A number of states and localities, however, enacted
more robust landmark statutes and ordinances, which permitted historic designation and
regulation of properties even if owners of such properties objected. See DANIEL R. MAN-
DELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 11.22—.34 (3d ed. 1993). In Penn Central Transport a City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld a common version of these land-
mark ordinances against the owner's challenge under the Constitution's Takings Clause.
46
 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For discussion of the issues relating to
preservation in Boerne, see Elizabeth C. Williamson, City of Boerne v. Flores and the Relig.
ious Freedom Restoration Act: The Delicate Balance Between Religious Freedom and Historic Preserva-
don, 13J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 107 (1997); Colin Black, Comment, The Free Exercise Clause
and Historic Preservation Law: Suggestions for a More Coherent Free Exercise Analysis, 72 Tut.. L.
REV. 1767 (1998).
47 See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
For commentary on the St. Bartholomew's decision, see Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Minis-
try vs. Mortar: A Legal and Policy Analysis of Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65
TEmP. L. REV. 91 (1992).
46
 The possibility of liturgically motivated alteration of the exterior of a house of wor-
ship is contemplated in the ordinance from which such structures were held exempt in
First Covenant Church u Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
45 See Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 5'71
(Mass. 1990). For commentary inspired in part by this decision, see Angela Cannella,
Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and Ar-
chitectural Review, 36 Vizi- L. REv. 401 (1991).
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decision in Employment Division v. Smith,50 the enactment of the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act,51 its partial invalidation in City of Boerne
v. Flores,52
 and the subsequent enactment of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act." In this space we can do more than
summarize the major trends over the question of exemption from his-
toric preservation ordinances for property devoted to religious uses.
We believe, however, that a principled approach to the Religion
Clauses requires symmetry between the Free Exercise question of ex-
emption and the Establishment Clause question of ineligibility for
government support. Uncertainty with respect to the exemption ques-
tion is, in our view, bound to give rise to corresponding uncertainty
on the question of the permissibility of the grants.
For purposes of this paper, we think it will be most useful to cate-
gorize the existing approaches to exemption of religious institutions
into four discrete models. The first, and broadest model, is that found
in the California legislative exemption. By statute, California exempts
all noncommercial property owned by religious corporations from the
authority of local government to designate properties as historical
landmarks.54 In East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State,55
 the
California Supreme Court upheld the statutory exemption against
claims that it violated the California Constitution or the Establish-
ment Clause of the federal Constitution. The court did not go so far
as to find that an exemption this broad was constitutionally required;
instead, it recognized that the state legislature had discretion to con-
clude that religious corporations would be significantly burdened by
5° 494 U.S. 872 (1990).5° Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). See Keeler v. Mayor
of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879,885-86 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that RFRA is unconstitu-
tional, and thus offers church no defense to landmark ordinance, but that application of
landmark ordinance to the church still violated the church's free exercise of religion, be-
cause the landmark ordinance was not a "neutral law of general applicability").
52 521 U.S. at 534-35 (holding RFRA invalid as applied to the states).
"Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
54 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25373(d) (West 2002). The exemption is not self-executing; in
order to claim it, a religious corporation must object to the application of the landmarking
law to its property, and "determine in a public forum that it will suffer substantial hardship
[defined in the section] if the [landmarking designation} is approved." id § 25373(d) (2).
The "public forum" referenced in the section is simply a meeting open to the public, not a
review of the exemption by a public body. For commentary on the California legislation,
see Felipe M. Nunez & Eric Sidman, California's Statutory Exemption for Religious Properties
from Landmark Ordinances: A Constitutional and Policy Analysis, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 271
(1995-96); Madeleine Randal, Comment, Holy War: In the Name of Religious Freedom, Califor-
nia Exempts Churches from Historic Preservation, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213 (1996).
n 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1735 (2001).
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the landmarking of any of their noncommercial property, and there-
fore to accommodate them in this way.58
The second model of exemption for religious structures from
landmarking regimes is exemplified by the 1992 decision of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in First Covenant Church tt Seattle." The court in
an earlier decision had ruled that the federal Free Exercise Clause
required all houses of worship to be exempt from such laws. 58 After
the Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded the
decision in light of Smith,59
 the Washington Supreme Court
reaffirmed its original result, resting its conclusions both on the "hy-
brid rights" theory discussed in Smith 6°
 and on the state constitution.
Thus, under First Covenant, "houses of worship" are entirely exempt
from landmark designation, though other property owned by relig-
ious institutions, even if put to religious uses, presumably is not.6 1
A third possible model of exemption is suggested by the 1990 de-
cision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Society of fesus v.
Boston Landmarks Commission. 62
 The Commission had designated as a
landmark elements of the interior of The Church of the Immaculate
Conception in South Boston. As the court described it, 'The designa-
tion restricted permanent alteration of the 'nave, chancel, vestibule
and organ loft on the main floor—the volume, window glazing, archi-
tectural detail, finishes, painting, the organ, and organ case.'"68 Rely-
ing exclusively on the state constitution, the court distinguished an
earlier ruling in which it had approved of landmark designation of
the exteriors of churches to the extent they were "open to view from a
public way."64
 Landmarking of an interior space, the court concluded,
56
 We discuss the California exemption, and its validation in East Bay, extensively in
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, passim. We conclude that the exemption is not required by
any sensible rendering of Separationist principle, and that it is far too great a departure
from Neutralism to be sustained. Id. at 74-76.
" 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
68
 First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1352, 1356 (Wash. 1990).
" 499 U.S. 901.
88 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83.
81 First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 185. It is unclear whether the exemption is limited to
properties used exclusively or primarily for worship purposes, or whether it might extend
to residential properties used occasionally for worship. The rationale of First Covenant,
which rests heavily on the values of religious expression associated with design of houses of
worship, would suggest that places used only occasionally for worship would not qualify.
" 564 N.E.2d at 573.
63 Id. at 572.
64 Id. at 573 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 783,784 (1955)).
1156	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43:1139
"is substantially more invasive, reaching into the church's actual wor-
ship space. "65
The final model is one of no exemption at all. This is exemplified
by the 1990 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York.66
 The St.
Bartholomew's Church decision involved an attempt by church officials
to escape a landmark designation in order to demolish what the court
described as an "auxiliary structure next to the Church's main house
of worship."67
 The church wanted to tear down this building, which
housed a variety of church activities including some of a decidedly
religious character, and replace it with a high-rise office tower that
would include both church uses and income-producing office space.
In denying the church the right to escape the landmark designation
on free exercise grounds, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the
then quite recent decision in Smith. The Landmarks Law in New York
City, the court concluded, is a religion-neutral law of general applica-
bility, and the Free Exercise Clause does not support claims of exemp-
tion from such regulatory regimes . 68
All four models of exemption—all property owned by religious
entities, houses of worship, interiors of houses of worship, and no ex-
emption—present different issues for those who wrestle with ques-
tions of the permissibility of preservation grants. The California
model appears to exclude all regulation of religious property, but the
scheme involves self-designation. Presumably, a religious corporation
could assent to landmarking, for worship space or otherwise, and
then seek a preservation grant. 69 The First Covenant model excludes all
houses of worship from landmarking designation, but here too it is
not clear if religious entities may, as in California, consent to the des-
65
 Id,
66 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
67 Id. at 350.
66 Id. at 354. The court also relied on the fact that the major burden on the church was
financial, rather an interference with its religious practice. Id. at 354-55. It therefore left
open the possibility that a landmarking of worship premises that did so interfere might
produce a different result, but it did not explain how or why, in light of Smith, such facts
would produce a different result. Smith itself involved a worship practice, the use of peyote
by Native American church members, and nothing in the Smith opinion suggests that the
character of the regulated practice will have any bearing upon application of the rule that
the Smith Court announced. See 494 U.S. 872.
Such a grant would be barred by the state constitution in California. See Frohliger v.
Richardson, 218 P. 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923). Other states with less absolute barriers to
such grants, however, might adopt the California model of deregulation of property owned
by religious entities.
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ignation and seek a grant to aid in preservation. The rule in the Sod-
ety of Jesus decision is limited to church interiors, and expressly
reaffirms the possibility of designation of the exteriors of houses of
worship. Once again, however, the exemption for interiors seems
permissive, not mandatory; houses of worship are not obliged to
claim it. 7° And the analysis in St. Bartholomew's Church suggests no
room for exemptions at all; from the decision's general character, and
its reliance on Smith, one might fairly presume that houses of worship,
interiors as well as exteriors, are (as a matter of federal law) fair game
for landmark designation in the Second Circuit. In such a jurisdic-
tion, in which worship space is subject to regulation, the question of
whether preservation grants are permissible for buildings devoted to
worship seems particularly pressing.
B. The Problem of Historic Preservation Grants
I. The Dueling Opinion Letters
Whatever the outcome on the regulatory side, has the movement
toward Neutralism moved far enough to encompass state grants to
religious groups for the preservation and upkeep of historic struc-
tures in which religious worship still occurs? That is, in those states
which recognize no exemption from landmarking for structures de-
voted to worship, or an interior exemption only, may the preservation
of such structures be supported financially by the state?
In the late 1980s, John Shannahan, the Director of the Connecti-
cut Historical Commission, was in a quandary over these precise ques-
tions. The Commission had authority to make grants for the purpose
of preserving historic buildings in Connecticut, and many of the
buildings of historic character in the state were churches. Various
towns and cities in Connecticut had landmarked their historic
churches, and a number of these churches had applied to the state
Historical Commission for preservation grants. The Director was quite
unsure, however, whether the Religion Clauses of the state or federal
constitutions would permit a grant to religious groups that controlled
" Our own view, expressed in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 88-90, is that First Cove-
nant goes too far, and Society of Jesus gets the matter right. Houses of worship should have
the same rights as other nonprofit associations (but no more) to complain, on the relig-
ion-neutral ground of compelled speech, about exterior designations. Interior designa-
tions, on the other hand, may press into worship space so deeply that we think they are
beyond the state's jurisdiction altogether, so that landmark designations of interiors should
not be permitted with or without the church's consent.
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such buildings, or (regardless of who controlled the building) a grant
to preserve a structure with religious use and/or significance. The
Director decided to ask for a legal opinion from the chief lawyer of
the executive branch of the State of Connecticut—Joseph I. Lieber-
man, then Attorney General of the state.
In a letter dated July 5, 1988, Attorney General Lieberman pro-
vided his opinion.n After surveying what he deemed the relevant
Connecticut and federal precedents on the subject, including a pair
of recent memoranda by federal agency lawyers who asserted that his-
toric preservation grants to religious institutions were constitutionally
questionable, 72 Lieberman concluded that such grants were indeed
permissible in a variety of circumstances. In his view, these grants
served legitimate purposes in the preservation of historical structures
in the state. They advanced religion only incidentally, they would not
entangle the granting agency in religious affairs, and they would not
be perceived as state endorsement of religion. Attorney General Lie-
berman distinguished Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist in three
ways. First, he noted that the "maintenance and repair" grants in Ny-
quist left a substantial amount of discretion in the private institutions
to decide how to allocate the funds; historic preservation grants are
much more precisely targeted." Second, the grants in Nyquist went to
a group of institutions dominated numerically by Roman Catholic
schools; the Connecticut grants went to a far wider and more relig-
iously pluralistic group of sects. 74
 Third, the grants disapproved in Ny-
quist paid a substantial portion of the maintenance budget of sectar-
ian schools; by contrast, the historic preservation grants tended to be
significantly smaller, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
total preservation costs."
n Letter from Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General, to John Shannahan, Director,
Connecticut Historical Commission (July 5, 1988) [hereinafter Lieberman Letter] (copy
on file with the authors).
72 Id. at 4 n.1 (citing a memorandum written in 1982 from Ralph W. Tarr, Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to William
H. Coldiron, Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior, and another written in 1979 by
James D. Webb, Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, U.S. Department of the
Interior).
73 Lieberman Letter, supra note 71, at 9.
74
75 id. ("Not only was the Nyquist Court concerned that the subject aid would be massive
in absolute terms, but also that it might have a 'massive' proportionate effect on such
schools, making it possible for them to obtain their 'entire maintenance and repair budg-
ets' from state tax-raised funds.") (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. u Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774
(1973)).
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Seven years later, in 1995, a federal agency renewed the question
that Attorney General Lieberman had answered for Director Shanna-
han. The Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior,
John Leshy, had drafted an opinion on the subject of "Historic Pres-
ervation Grants for Religious Properties" for the Director of the Na-
tional Park Service, Roger Kennedy. Leshy presented the draft opin-
ion, which suggested that intervening changes in constitutional law
might have removed the legal impediments to such grants, to Walter
Dellinger, who was then the Assistant Attorney General in the Office
of Legal Counsel in the United States Department of Justice. After
surveying a number of the same precedents as the Lieberman letter
had discussed, including in particular Nyquist and Tilton v. Richardson,
and qualifying his conclusion with defensive assertions that the "ques-
tion of government aid to religious institutions is ... difficult," 76 and
"the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area is still developing," 77
Dellinger's memorandum expressed the ultimate judgment "that a
court applying current precedent is most likely to conclude that the
direct award of historic preservation grants to churches and other
pervasively sectarian institutions violates the Establishment Clause?" 7S
The Dellinger memorandum remains the policy of the federal gov-
ernment with respect to expenditures for the upkeep of buildings de-
voted to worship. 79
Did then-Attorney General Lieberman have the better view in
1988 than then-Assistant Attorney General Dellinger in 1995? The
Liebertnan letter tilts heavily toward Neutralism, which had displaced
Separationism to some extent by 1988, and to an even greater extent
when Dellinger wrote in 1995. Moreover, decisions rendered since
1995 have reduced the force of Separationism still further, especially
in cases involving government financial support that benefits religious
institutions along with a broad mix of secular entities. If Lieberman
76
 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Inte-
rior 7 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.hun
 [hereinafter Del-
linger Memorandum] (copy on file with the authors).
11 Id. at 8.
18 Id. The Dellinger memorandum also considered briefly whether the Free Exercise
Clause limited the government in landmarking religious buildings in the first place. Al-
though pretending not to take a position on the issue, the memorandum betrayed its
author's Separationist leanings—also suggested by its conclusion on the question of
grants—by asserting that the reasoning of the most prominent decision exempting relig-
ious houses of worship from landmarking laws Is persuasive." Id. at 5-6 (citing First Cove.
nant, and distinguishing St. Bartholomew's Church, 914 F.2d 348).
79 See infra notes 80-91.
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was right in 1988, his view must be even more correct today. Yet, as
noted in Part II above, the shift to Neutrality and away from Separa-
tionism is incomplete. Can one fairly say, as Lieberman did in 1988,
that historic preservation grants are so different from the "mainte-
nance and repair" grants struck down in Nyquist that the shift toward
Neutrality is sufficient to validate grants for the historic preservation
of structures currently devoted to worship? Indeed, if Lieberman is
correct about preservation grants for houses of worship, one' would
think that Nyquist should be overruled. If grants for the upkeep of
houses of worship are constitutionally permissible, similar grants to
religious schools, which serve some secular purposes, should certainly
be valid.
This is obviously an unfinished story. For its latest chapters, we
turn to policies articulated, and practices engaged in, concerning his-
toric preservation grants by those on the front line of administration.
As the tale unfolds, its lessons suggest significant—and perhaps ap-
propriate—hesitation about the shift from Separationism to Neutral-
ism.
2. Current Policy and Practice
Support for historic preservation is available from the federal
government and many states, and takes a variety of forms. 8° Beyond
the official recognition that comes with listing a property in the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places or a state's register, owners of his-
toric properties may also receive technical assistance, tax incentives,
low-interest loans, and grants to assist them in restoring and preserv-
ing their structures. In examining the constitutional implications of
providing such assistance to religious institutions, we focus on public
grants. We look first at the federal programs that provide such grants,
and then turn to state programs.
a. Federal Historic Preservation Grants
The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), enacted in 1966,
establishes the criteria for determining which properties are eligible
to be listed in the National Register, and also empowers the United
States Department of the Interior to make grants—either directly or
80 There are a range of nongovernmental funding sources for preservation of houses
of worship. For more information on such sources, see Partners for Sacred Places, Resources
for Sacred Places, available at http://www.sacredplaces.org/resources.html (last visited Sept.
2002).
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through a state historic preservation office—to subsidize preservation
and restoration of listed properties." The regulations permit "proper-
ties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes" to
be listed in the National Register only if the properties "deriv[e] pri-
mary significance from architectural or artistic distinction or histori-
cal importance,"82
 and not because of the structures' religious
significance. At present, several thousand properties owned by relig-
ious institutions and actively used for religious purposes are listed on
the National Register. 83
At least since the early 1980s, the federal government has fol-
lowed a Separationist policy regarding historic preservation grants to
religious institutions." Concerns about violating the Establishment
Clause led the federal government to deem such properties ineligible
for any program that provides grants for "bricks and mortar." React-
ing against this policy, Congress amended the NHPA in 1992 to
authorize preservation grants to religious properties: "[G]rants may
be made under this subsection for the preservation, stabilization, res-
toration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National
Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is
secular, does not promote religion, and seeks to protect those quali-
ties that are historically significant."85
 Congress's directive, however,
did not change the policy of the Justice Department or the practice of
the federal agencies; both policy and practice remain fundamentally
Separationist. Citing the Dellinger memorandum, the National Park
Service's Historic Preservation Funds Grants Manual bars grants for
"construction repair costs, or real property acquisition costs" related
to historic properties owned by religious institutions. 86 The "Save
America's Treasures" program, administered jointly by the National
81
 The National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000). Implementing regu-
lations for the Act can be found at 36 C.F.R. §§ 60-63, 65-68 (2002). Further information
about federal programs for historic preservation can be found on the website of the Na-
tional Park Service. See National Park Service, Grants, 71:x Credit & Other Assistance ,
available at http://www.craips.gov/helpyou.htm
 (last modified Sept. 3, 2002); see also
Cohen, supra note 4 (describing federal historic preservation programs).
62 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (a).
63 E-mail from Patrick Andrus, Historian, National Register of Historic Places, to Joann
Corey ( July 19, 2001) (copy on file with the authors).
64
 Letter from Frederick N. Khedouri, Associate Director, Office of Management and
Budget, to the Honorable James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 19, 1981) (refer-
enced in Dellinger Memorandum and in Lieberman letter).
85 16 U.S.C. § 470(e) (4).
se
	 PARK SERVICE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION FUNDS GRANTS MANUAL ch. 6, at
E(4) (Oct. 1997).
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Park Service and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, con-
tains a similar prohibition on funding "[h]istoric properties and col-
lections associated with an active religious organization (for example,
restoration of an historic church that is still actively used as a
church) . "87
The Separationist policy reflected in the Dellinger memorandum
extends to other federal programs that provide grants for "bricks and
mortar."88 The United States Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program
authorizes the Department to make grants for preservation and re-
construction of structures serving a wide variety of purposes in a
community, benefiting both commercial and nonprofit institutions 8 9
The CDBG program, however, imposes tight restrictions on any fund-
ing used to rehabilitate structures owned by religious entities. In or-
der to receive funding, the structure must be leased to a "wholly secu-
lar" entity—for no more than the fair market value of the property
before the funded rehabilitation—and used only for secular pur-
poses.99 Similarly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) provides Federal Disaster Assistance grants to a broad variety
of "non-profit facilities" that provide basic services to the general pub-
lic, including schools, museums, community centers, and libraries.°
97
 Save America's Treasures, FY 2002 Historic Preservation Fund Grant Application
Form 2, available at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/treasures/SAT2002.pdf  (last visited Sept.
2002) (copy on file with the authors); see also Letter from Robert Stanton, Director, Na-
tional Park Service, to Senator Slade Gorton (Feb. 4, 2000) (explaining that because of the
Justice Department's interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the Park Service cannot
spend the $151,000 earmarked in Public Law 106-.113, under the Save America's Treasures
program, for the historic preservation of St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Cathedral in Tar-
pon Springs, Florida) (copy on file with the authors).
99
 In addition to programs discussed in this paragraph, Separationist policy is also visi-
ble in the following federal programs administered by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development that provide grants for preservation, restoration, or construction: the
Home Investment Partnerships Program, 24 C.F.R. § 92.257 (2002) (barring religious or-
ganizations from participating in program that provides federal money to rehabilitate or
construct low-income housing); Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS, id
§ 574.300(c) (2) (restrictions on use of program funds for rehabilitation or conversion of
structures owned by religious organizations); the Emergency Shelter Grants Program, id
§ 576.23(b) (restrictions on grants to convert or rehabilitate structures owned by religious
organizations); the Supportive Housing Program, id. § 583.150 (restrictions on participa-
tion of religious institutions in program of housing and services for the homeless).
89 Id § 570.208 (2002).
99
 Id § 570.200 (J).
91 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (2002) (definition of ''non-profit facilities" eligible for public
disaster assistance grants); IS § 206.222 (providing that nonprofit facilities, along with
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The category of nonprofit facilities eligible for FEMA disaster assis-
tance grants specifically excludes facilities used for religious pur-
poses.92
Despite this rather consistent Separationism, a closer look at fed-
eral programs that provide grants for "bricks and mortar" reveals a
somewhat more complicated picture." Religious properties affected
by disasters are eligible for low-interest loans through a program ad-
ministered by the Small Business Administration." The owners of
such properties may receive FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants as part
of a community-wide mitigation project.95
 Indeed, FEMA's website
celebrates the financial support provided by its program of Hazard
Mitigation Grants to relocate a church out of a flood plain." In addi-
tion, the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 provides low-income
reconstruction loans to any nonprofit organization, including relig-
ious institutions, victimized by arson or terrorism motivated by racial
or religious animus." When several historic churches—and a number
of other houses of worship—were seriously damaged because of the
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, FEMA
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development initially re-
fused to provide federal aid for their reconstruction." The agencies
later relented when Congress specifically directed that "notwithstand-
state and local governments and Indian tribes, are eligible to receive public disaster assis-
tance grants).
92 Id. § 206.221(e) (1) (category of educational facility eligible for disaster assistance
grant "does not include buildings, structures, and related items used primarily for religious
purposes or instruction"); FEMA Response and Recovery Directorate Policy No. 9521.1
(Aug. 11, 1998), available at www.fetna.gov/m/pa/9521_1.shun
 (defining "community
center" in 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (6) to exclude "Facilities established or primarily used for
religious—or similar—activities").
93
 See, for example, the recent announcement that HUD will permit the use of grant
money for maintenance and repair of structures owned by religious institutions. See supra.
note 40.
91
 Physical Disaster Business Loans Program, 13 C.F.R. §123.200 (2002).
95
 For the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, see 44 C.F.R. §78.12 (2002).
FEMA, A Church Gets Moved Out of Harm's Way in Pennsylvania (May 26, 2000), avail-
able at www.fema.gov/nwz00/nwz00_22.shun.
91
 The Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392
(1996) (Section 4 creates the Loan Guarantee Recovery Fund); see also 24 C.F.R. § 573
(2002) (the Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations governing the
loan fund established by the Church Arson Prevention Act). Professor Esbeck collects
these and other examples of the trend away from Separationism in Carl Esbeck, Myths,
Miscues, and Misconceptions; No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 No'nut
DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pun. P0L'v 285,285-86 & n.4 (1999).
" See Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. Emits
& PUB. P0L'Y 341, 35411.22 (1999).
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ing any other provision of law, such funds may be used for the repair
and reconstruction of religious institution facilities damaged by the
explosion in the same manner as private nonprofit facilities providing
public services."99 Ultimately, Oklahoma City churches received over
six million dollars in federal funds to help repair damage from the
bombing. 100 •
Federal historic preservation programs also depart from the ro-
bust Separationism articulated in the Dellinger memorandum. Al-
though Department of the Interior policies prohibit the use of federal
funds for "development"—preservation and renovation—projects in-
volving historic religious properties, the policies allow grants to such
properties for "pre-development" costs. 101 "Pre-development" costs
include architectural plans for restoration or renovation of the struc-
ture, consulting fees incurred in preparing forms for inclusion in the
National Register of Historic Places, and other similar expenses.
The restoration of Ebenezer Baptist Church, financed by a grant
through the "Save America's Treasures" program as part of the Martin
Luther King, Jr. National Historic Site, provides an illuminating study
in the limits of Separationism as an official policy. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. was a co-pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church during the years
" 141 Cong. Rec. 116621 (daily ed. June 29, 1995). See also statement of Rep. Istook:
Mt Speaker, Congress is aware that several downtown churches were se-
verely damaged as a result of the April 19, 1995, terrorist bombing of the Al-
fred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Among these are First
United Methodist Church, First Baptist Church, St. Paul's Episcopal Cathe-
dral and St. Joseph's Catholic Church. These churches assisted in the emer-
gency relief effort immediately after the bombing and one was even used as a
temporary morgue for victims of the blast.
These religious institutions have been informed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency that under current regulations they are not eligible for
any federal disaster assistance for the repair and reconstruction of their facili-
ties. However, Congress recognizes that the Oklahoma City bombing is a
unique case. The bombing was a single, man-made assault directed against
our national government. These churches, like the other businesses and resi-
dences in the damaged area, were innocent bystanders to a violent attack on
the federal government. This special instance is therefore distinguished from
other kinds of disasters in which religious buildings may be damaged. Con-
gress thus agrees that religious institutions in Oklahoma City should be eligi-
ble for the federal assistance provided in this bill in the same manlier as non-
profit organizations providing public services.
141 Cong. Rec. El 439 (daily ed. Julie 29, 1995) (statement of Rep. Istook).
100 Pat Gilliland, Church Thanks City Council—Funds Assist in Restoration, THE DAILY OK-
LAHOMAN, Apr. 2, 1997, at III/1.
101 NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION FTJNO GRANTS MANUAL ch. 6, at
(E) (3) (Oct. 1997).
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of his leadership of the civil rights movement, and he preached many
of his famous sermons on civil rights, race relations, and civil disobe-
dience from its pulpit. The congregation of Ebenezer Baptist still
owns the church property, but leased the historic church to the Na-
tional Park Service as part of a deal that provided the congregation
with a parcel, adjacent to the historic church, on which the congrega-
tion has built a new sanctuary.'" Under the terms of its ninety-nine-
year lease to operate the church as a historic site, the Park Service
conducts tours and offers programs open to the public. The congre-
gation of Ebenezer holds its regular services in the new sanctuary but
remains free to use the historic church for special worship events, at
which times the Park Service closes the church to the general pub-
lic.'" Accurate presentation of Dr. King's life, not to mention the en-
tire civil rights movement, requires attention to the important role of
African-American churches, but a consistent Separationist policy
would preclude the close relationship between the Park Service and
Ebenezer Baptist Church.'"
b. State Historic Preservation Grants
To the extent that state historic preservation offices act merely as
conduits of federal funds, their grants are bound by the Separationist
policies reflected in the Dellinger memorandum. A significant num-
ber of states, however, provide additional funds for historic preserva-
tion, and these state programs reflect quite disparate attitudes toward
financing religious properties.'" We look first at programs that follow
102 For descriptions of the agreement between Ebenezer Baptist Church and the Na-
tional Park Service, see Park Service Takes Over Legacy of Historic Ebenezer Baptist, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., May 1, 1996, at 1B; Kevin Sack, A New Place to Nourish One Dreamer's Legacy, N.Y.
Tats, Mar. 8, 1999, at Al2, col. 1; Gayle White, Historic Old Church to Get New Sanctuary,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 23, 1997, at 5C.
I" See E.N. Smith, Park Service Will Preserve Historic King Church; Congregation Moves to
Make Room for Progress, CHATTANOOGA TIMES/CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Feb. 20, 1999, at
Fl ("A 99 year lease will enable the Park Service to offer tours, lectures, book signings and
other programs, including live choral performances at the historic church. However,
members of the congregation will still be allowed to celebrate special occasions there.").
"4
 For commentary on the Park Service's struggles in managing sacred sites, especially
those of Native Americans, see Shawna Lee, Note, Government Managed Shrines: Protection of
Native American Sacred Site Worship, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 265 (2000); Charles Levendosky, Re-
specting Sacred Sites: Why Not Accommodate Indians at Devils Tbwer as We Accommodate Christians
Elsewhere?, DENVER ROCICY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 18, 1997, at 1B; see also Lee, supra, at
306-07 (discussing the Park Service's agreement with Ebenezer Baptist Church).
05
 For a survey of state historic preservation grant programs, see National Trust for
Historic Preservation, State Funding for Historic Preservation—A State-by-State Summary (May/
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the federal government's Separationism, and then at programs that
adopt the Neutralism represented by the Lieberman letter.
i. Separationist Policies
Of the state historic preservation programs that share the federal
government's Separationist policy, which bars most preservation
grants to religious properties, some appear to do so because they find
the Dellinger memorandum either persuasive or binding. 106 Other
states adopt a Separationist policy on particular state-law grounds. In
.California, state historic preservation grants to religious organizations
appear to be prohibited by the 1923 decision of the state's Court of
Appeals in Frohliger V. Richardson, which held that a state appropriation
for restoration of the San Diego Mission was barred by the state con-
stitution's absolute ban on funding sectarian institutions. 107 In Geor-
gia, the state's Division for Natural Resources recently discontinued its
practice of awarding historic preservation grants to religious organiza-
tions because of concerns that the practice violated the state constitu-
tion's (strongly Separationist) religion clause.'" Virginia also has strict
June 2002), available at http://www.nationaltrustorg/help/State_Funding.pdf
 (on file
with the authors).
11 S6 See, e.g., E-mail from Alice Baldrica, Nevada State Historic Preservation Office, to
Joann Corey (July 23, 2001) (copy on file with the authors); E-mail from Herb Dawson,
Deputy Director, Montana State Historic Preservation Office, to Joann Corey (July 23,
2001) (copy on file with the authors); E-mail from Jon Smith, Deputy Director, Indiana
State Historic Preservation Office, to Joann Corey (July 20, 2001) (copy on file with the
authors) (responses of the Indiana, Montana, and Nevada state historic preservation
offices all linking state limits on grants to religious institutions to federal policies). Minne-
sota declares religious properties ineligible to receive state historic preservation grants, but
does not explain why. Minnesota State Historical Society, State Grants-in-Aid Program Pro-
ject Guidelines 1 (Sept. 1998), available at www.nuths.org/about/grants/pdffiles/guide-
lines. pdf.
107 See generally Frohliger, 218 P. 497. The California Constitution provides that no gov-
ernment entity may "grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or
sectarian purpose." /d. at 498 (citing CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (now located at art. XVI,
§ 5)). The current picture in California is more complicated than the state constitutional
analysis in Frohliger would suggest. Some "public spaces" in religious properties seem to be
eligible for state historic preservation grants, though the precise nature of the eligible
projects is unclear from the grants guidelines, which indicate that the questions will be
resolved by the administrator on a case-by-case basis. See California Office of Historic Pres-
ervation, Grant Application and Procedural Guide for the California Heritage Fund Grant
Program 1, 12 (2001), available at http://ohp.parks.ca.gov/pages/1054/files/
nov_Olchfgrantapp.pdf.
10* "State suspends historic site grants to churches," ATLANTA J. CONST., May 25,
2000, at 5C. See also E-mail from Cherie Blizzard, Grants Coordinator, Historic Preservation
Division, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, to Joann Corey (July 16, 2001) (citing
state constitution as the reason the state "no longer makes historic preservation grantls) to
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constitutional limits on state grants to religious organizations, but al-
lows churches to transfer ownership of the property to a secular non-
profit institution—which would be eligible for state historic preserva-
tion grants, and would operate the church as a historic site open to
the public—and the congregation can then lease the worship space
back from the secular entity."9
ii. Neutralist Policies
Many, and perhaps most, of the states that offer their own historic
preservation grants do not share the federal government's Separa-
tionist policies, 11° though these states impose a wide range of condi-
tions on grants to religious organizations. One feature shared by all
programs that finance historic preservation of religious properties—
and indeed by the federal requirements for listing religious properties
in the National Register of Historic Places—is that the property's
religious organizations") (copy on file with the authors). Georgia's state constitution pro-
vides: "No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid
of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of any sectarian institution." GA.
CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 7. A number of states have constitutional provisions of this charac-
ter. See generally Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117
(2000) (asserting that twenty-to-thirty states have such constitutional provisions.) A panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held invalid, as a viola-
tion of the federal Free Exercise Clause, an application of Washington's church-state provi-
sion to a state-subsidized scholarship program. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (fith Cir.
2002). We elaborate further on the relationship between state and federal constitutional
law of church-state separation in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, lanai' v. Simmons-
Harris: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Evoluation of Establishment Clause Norms, 78 No-
TAR. D.sux L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
loR See E-mail from Kathleen Kilpatrick, Virginia State Historic Preservation Office, to
Joann Corey ( July 23, 2001) (describing grant to Christ Church in Lancaster, Va.) (copy
on file with the authors). The prohibition on funding properties owned by religious or-
ganizations is found in VA. CODE § 10.1-2213(A) (3) (West 2002). New York City's Land-
marks Preservation Council's Historic Preservation Grant Program is funded by a federal
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG); to comply with the CDBG restrictions on
funding religious properties, the Council will only fund religious properties where owner-
ship has been transferred to a secular nonprofit entity which then manages the property,
and can lease back a portion to the religious entity for use as worship space. See E-mail
from William Neely, Director, Historic Preservation Grant Program, New York City Land-
marks Preservation Commission, to Joann Corey ( July 17, 2001) (copy on file with the
authors).
110
 Because the Establishment Clause binds the states as well as the federal govern-
ment, the Dellinger memorandum's interpretation, if correct, should apply to both federal
and state funding streams. That many states deviate from the memorandum reflects (1)
the phenomenon of independent voices in constitutional interpretation within the federal
system, and (2) substantial uncertainty about the content and path of Establishment
Clause principles.
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significance is determined on secular terms, such as its architectural
merit or role in important historical events."'
A common condition limits grants to religious institutions to re-
pairs that are publicly visible. Texas and New Jersey, for example, only
support work on the exterior of religious properties." 2 Other jurisdic-
tions, however, permit grants for restoring and preserving the interior
of religious properties, provided that the properties offer the public a
reasonable opportunity to view the interior "without being required
to participate in or witness any religious activides."" 3 The New York
" See, e.g., Lieberman Letter, supra note 71, at 15 ("Any religious property which is the
subject of a state preservation grant should meet standard criteria for grant-worthiness
based on the property's intrinsic historical, architectural, or other cultural values."); see also
National Historical Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000) (criteria for listing religious
property).
112 See Garden State Historic Preservation Trust Fund, 2002 Grant Guidelines 16 avail.
able at http://www.njht.org/guidelines-2002.pclf (last visited Sept. 2002) (New Jersey pro-
gram does not fund "costs involving the interiors of buildings used primarily for religious
worship or a religious purpose") [hereinafter New Jersey Guidelines]; Texas Historical
Commission, Guidelines for Preservation Grant Applications 4, available at http://
www.thc.state.tx.us/forms/tptf/TVIIGuidelines03.pdf  (last visited Sept. 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Texas Guidelines]. The Arizona Heritage Preservation Grant Fund (administered by
the state Parks Commission) seems to allow grants to churches for exterior work, though
its website indicates that churches are ineligible. See E-mail from Jim Garrison, Arizona
State Historic Preservation Office, to Joann Corey (July 12, 2001) ("Active churches are
eligible for grants so long as the grant is limited to the exterior or clearly architectural
elements.") (copy on file with the authors); see also Arizona State Parks, Historic Preserva-
tion Fund, Grant Program Information, http://www.pr.state.az.us/ partnerships/grants/
histpres.html (last visited Sept. 2002). Florida has a similar limitation: "Grant assistance to
projects which serve a religious purpose if restricted to exterior features or that work
which can be viewed from the public right-of-way." E-mail from Robert C. Taylor, Historic
Preservationist Supervisor, Florida Department of State, Division of Historical Resources,
Bureau of Historic Preservation, to Joann Corey ( July 16, 2001) (copy on file with the
authors); see also Maryland Historical Trust Capital Grant Program, Fiscal Year 2004 Grant
Guidelines 3, available at http://www.marylandhistoricaltrustmet/capguide.pdf (last visited
Sept. 2002) ("Structures used for religious purposes may be eligible for MHT grant assis-
tance for exterior work only and will be reviewed by MHT on a case by case basis.").
112 Colorado State Historical Fund, Grant Program Guidelines, Version 2003-01, at 21,
available at http://www.coloradohistory-oahp.org/publications/pubs/1412GuidelinesTO .
pcif (last visited Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Colorado Guidelines); see also Lieberman Letter,
supra note 71, at 15 (if related work is done in a [religious] building's interior, the public
must be provided with reasonable opportunity to view the restored structures (as often as
possible) during times when no religious service or instruction is being conducted in the
immediate vicinity"). The Lieberman Letter reflects current Connecticut practice. See E
mail from Paul Loether, Connecticut Historical Commission, to Joann Corey (July 13,
2001) (copy on file with the authors); see also Connecticut Historical Commission, Historic
Preservation Fund—Phase II Guidelines, available at http://www.chc.state.ct.us/HRF-
Phase2.htn1
 (last visited Sept. 2002); New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and His-
toric Preservation, 9 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REG/S tit. 9, § 432.4(b) (West 2002) (reason-
able accessibility requirement for any historic preservation grant made to not-for-profit
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State historic preservation program requires grantees that use grants
for interior restoration to open the property "to the general public at
least 12 times a year at reasonably spaced intervals."'" Pennsylvania
requires that the benefited property "must be open and accessible to
the public on a regular basis, not less than 100 days per year." 115 In
requiring public accessibility to state-subsidized interior portions of
historical structures, these agencies treat religious institutions no dif-
ferently than other grantees.
Somewhat more complicated are restrictions designed to segre-
gate expenditures with primarily historical, architectural, or cultural
value from benefits that flow primarily to the religious use of the
property. Several states restrict the use of grants for "liturgical
items."116
 Architectural elements included in this category are
"stained glass windows illustrating religious themes," "steeple
crosses,"118 and altars. 119
 Other states highlight their funding of such
items, however, as central to preserving and restoring the fabric of
historically significant features of the property. 12° Vermont Historic
Preservation grants are regularly awarded for preservation of church
steeples. 121
 Texas attempts to draw the line between appropriate and
entity); E-mail from Eric Gilbertson, Director, Vermont Division for Historic Preservation,
to Joann Corey (July 24, 2001) ("We do not fund strictly religious items or interior work
on areas not open to the public.") (copy on file with the authors).
114 Cohen, supra note 4, at 7.
tis Keystone Historic Preservation Grant Program, Eligibility Requirements, available at
www.artsnet.org/phmc/key_guide,html
 (last visited Sept. 2002).
116 See E-mail from Greg Griffith, Deputy State Historic Preservation Officer, Washing-
ton State Office of Archaeology and Historic Presentation, to Joann Corey (Aug. 6, 2001)
(Washington State Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation, Rehabilitation Grant-
in-Aid Program) ("Clearly, we would not and could not fund rehabilitation of elements of
the church that pertained to the liturgy or aspects that support the service or mission of
the church.") (copy on file with the authors); Colorado Guidelines, supra note 113, at 21-
22 ("Grant funds cannot be used to restore religious symbols"); Lieberman Letter, supra
note 71, at 15 (concerns about funding "repair of a ritual object"); E-mail from Theodore
Hild, Deputy, Illinois State Historic Preservation Office, to Joann Corey (July 24, 2001)
(Illinois Historic Preservation Agency Grant-in-Aid Program) ("the grant project must be
for non-liturgical purposes") (copy on file with the authors).
111
 Colorado Guidelines, supra note 113, at 22; E-mail from Theodore Hild, supra note
116 (Illinois program).
116
 Colorado Guidelines, supra note 113, at 22.
1116 See E-mail from Theodore Hild, supra note 116 (Illinois prop am).
139
 Massachusetts and Vermont have both funded the preservation of stained-glass
windows. For Massachusetts, see e-mail from Elsa Fitzgerald, Assistant Director, Massachu-
setts Historical Commission, to Joann Corey (Aug. 2, 2001) (copy on file with the authors).
For Vermont, see e-mail from Eric Gilbertson, supra note 113.
161
 E-mail from Elsa Fitzgerald, supra note 120; E-mail from Eric Gilbertson, supra note
113.
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inappropriate purposes by funding only "the difference between a
rehabilitation project and a restoration project;" the religious organi-
zation must pay the rehabilitation costs—that which is necessary to
make the space useable—and the Texas Trust Preservation Fund will
assist in expenditures beyond that point aimed at preserving or restor-
ing the historic fabric of the property. 122 Connecticut, following the
Lieberman letter, restricts any state preservation grants "without
which certain religious activities could not continue," such as "exten-
sive structural support work in a church,"123 although other states
fund work on the basic structure and foundations of religious proper-
des. 124
Finally, as a condition of receiving historic preservation grants,
religious properties (like all other grantees) typically must convey to
the granting agency a historic preservation easement. 125 The ease-
ment binds the grantee and the grantee's successors to both
affirmative and negative covenants, for a duration that may vary ac-
cording to the value of the grant. A small grant may require only an
easement for a term of ten years, whereas a substantial grant may re-
quire an easement in perpetuity. 126 The basic affirmative obligation is
a promise to maintain the benefited property—the whole property,
typically, and not just the portion affected by the grant—according to
122 Terry Colley of the Texas Historical Commission explains that, for example, if a
church wanted to replace an original slate roof with a shingle roof, we would make a grant
to help them [use] slate." E-mail from Terry Colley, Deputy Director, Texas Historical
Commission, to Joann Corey (July 24, 2001) (copy on file with the authors).
125 Lieberman Letter, supra note 71, at 15.
124 See, e.g., E-mail from Greg Griffith, supra note 116 ("If a grant were to be awarded to
a religious property, we would clearly restrict the use of the funds to the preservation of
character defining features of the building or a project that would assure preservation of
the building for safety, structural, functional reasons (i.e., foundation, roofing, ADA com-
pliance, etc.).").
125 See National Park Service, Heritage Preservation Services, Historic Preservation Ease-
ments, available at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/tps/tax/easement.htm (last visited Sept. 2002)
(describing preservation easements); see also Arkansas Historic Preservation Program,
Conservation Easements, available at http://wwwarkansaspreservation.org/preservation/
easements.asp (last visited Sept. 2002); Arkansas Historic Preservation Program, Historic
Preservation and Restoration Grants Manual 9, available at http://www.arkansaspres-
ervation.org/preservation/Grants HPRG Manual.pdf (last visited Sept. 2002). The Illi-
nois Heritage Grant program has a sample covenant form available on its website. Illinois
Historic Preservation Agency, Heritage Grant Program Manual FY2003 ( July 2002), avail-
able at http://statellus/hpa/PS/HGManual03.pdf [hereinafter Illinois Grant Program
Manual].
126 See, e.g., Colorado Guidelines, supra note 113, at 25 (describing variable terms of
duration for easements depending on the value of the grant received); Texas Guidelines,
supra note 112, at 6 (same).
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specific preservation standards.' 27
 In addition, grantees usually must
guarantee reasonable public access to the property." 8
 The chief nega-
tive covenant is the grantee's promise not to make any changes, in-
cluding demolition, to the historic features of the structure without
the consent of the preservation agency. 129
 If the grantee breaches one
of the covenants, the preservation agency is entitled to bring an ac-
don for whatever injunctive relief is appropriate to cure the breach,
including orders to restore improper changes to the structure or to
maintain aspects of the property that the grantee has neglected. 13°
W. PRESERVATION GRANTS, CONSTITUTIONAL SYMMETRY, AND THE
NEW SEPARATIONISM
The story of historic preservation grants to religious institutions
can be told in at least two ways. The first is a tale of Religion Clause
jurisprudence as an inexorable march from Separationism to Neutral-
ism. In this account, the Dellinger memorandum, and the federal
129 See, e.g., Illinois Historic Preservation Agency, Heritage Grant Program Manual FY
2003 (July 2002), available at http://statell.us/hpa/PS/HGManual03.pdf
 (grant recipi-
ents covenant to maintain their property according to the Secretary of the Interior's Stan-
dards for Historic Preservation Projects); Maryland's Historic Preservation Grant Program,
Fiscal Year 2004, Capital Grant Guidelines 10, available at http://www.marylandhistorical-
trustnet/capguide.pdf (last visited Sept. 2002).
155 The public access requirement is not unique to religious entities but is a general
feature of public grants to nongovernmental entities, and is typically included as an
affirmative covenant in the preservation easement. The New Jersey program is a good
example of this requirement:
Public access is required to all resources receiving capital funds. The Trust
and the grantee will negotiate the days and hours that the property will be
open, based on the type of work funded by the grant, if the property is not
accessible to the public at the time of application.
• A grant for exterior work requires the applicant to open the grounds to the
public, but does not compel the applicant to make the interior accessible to
the public.
• Interior work will require the applicant to open the building to the public.
• No additional access is necessary for properties open to the public on a
regular basis, such as museums, libraries, or schools.
New Jersey Guidelines, supra note 112, at 19.
129 See Illinois Grant Program Manual, supra note 125; New Jersey Guidelines, supra
note 112, at 19. The power to enforce the easement is generally given to the preservation
agency that made the grant, but some grantors also permit the easement's benefit to be
given to a different (usually local) historic society. See, e.g., Colorado Guidelines, supra note
113, at 25 (permitting preservation grant recipients to give easement to other approved
preservation societies).
ISO See Illinois Grant Program Manual, supra note 125 (citing specific remedies avail-
able to the preservation agency).
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policies that rely on it, are anachronisms, the last vestiges of an era in
which religious institutions were systematically excluded from a vari-
ety of public benefits. The ultimate destination of this march lies be-
yond the Lieberman letter, which gives only qualified permission to a
state historical commission to make grants to preserve religious prop-
erties."' Neutralism, taken to its conclusion, ends up eliminating all
distinctions between religious and secular institutions.
A second version of the story draws on a somewhat different ac-
count of Religion Clause jurisprudence. This account, with which we
are sympathetic, redraws rather than obliterates the idea of Separa-
tionism, and stands in tension with Neutralism's relentless leveling of
the distinction between religious and secular institutions. Though ear-
lier Separationists overstated the distinctiveness of religious institu-
tions, the Neutralists ignore the constitutionally salient reasons for
maintaining limits on government with respect to such institutions." 2
In this revised and more limited Separationism, defining the bound-
ary between sacred and secular remains the essential task of Religion
Clause theory. The distinctions reflected in contemporary state poli-
cies about preservation grants—exterior versus interior, liturgical
items versus others, structural support versus historic fabric—repre-
sent intuitive efforts to discern, in ways more nuanced than the abso-
lute Separationism reflected in the Dellinger memorandum, this line
between sacred and secular.
At the heart of this more limited Separationism is the principle of
Religion Clause symmetry. The requirement of symmetry is not an
aesthetic one; rather, it reflects a larger, substantive theory of the Re-
ligion Clauses, pursuant to which the realms of worship of, and faith
in, the transcendent lie beyond the jurisdiction of the state.'" This
jurisdictional limit remains the same regardless of whether the legal
context is one of regulatory burdens or state-conferred benefits.
If Religion Clause symmetry is a guiding principle of constitu-
tional architecture, one helpful way to approach the problem of line
drawing in the provision of government funds to religious institutions
is to analyze the question of permissible government regulation of
such institutions. Like grant-making officials, courts and legislatures
that have considered the application of landmarking ordinances to
religious entities have wrestled with a problem of linedrawing. They
131 Lieberman Letter, supra note 71, at 15 (requiting disclaimers of government en-
dorsement, and suggesting limits to state financing of structural support).
132 We develop these reasons at greater length in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 78-92.
133 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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have been pressed to decide whether exemptions should extend to all
noncommercial property owned by such entities, or just houses of
worship, or, more restrictive still, only the interiors of worship struc-
tures. 1 M Our own view, advanced in earlier work, is that a Neutralist
approach—including a robust, religion-neutral doctrine of compelled
speech—provides appropriate protection for the exterior of religious
properties."5
 The exteriors of houses of worship, like the exteriors of
other buildings, often form vital parts of the shared landscape, the
cultural environment of the community in which the .structures are
located.
Regulation of the exterior of houses of worship, subject only to a
religion-neutral doctrine permitting escape from being compelled to
advance a message to which the organization no longer adheres, will
allow for the landmarking of religious features of exterior design,
Steeples, religious gargoyles, and statuary on the outside of a worship
structure, and other exterior symbols associated with a faith tradition
all fall within the scope of appropriate historic preservation orders
because all are visible to passersby and constitute part of the histori-
cally significant design features of the property or neighborhood.
With respect to the interior of houses of worship, however, we
believe that Separationist concerns about proper limits on the gov-
ernment's power with respect to religion require distinctive protec-
tions. Although the government's aesthetic and historic reasons for
regulating interiors are no different from the justification for regulat-
ing exteriors, state intrusion on the interior of worship structures pre-
sents an unusually high risk that state agents will become co-authors
of the religious experiences of those who worship in those spaces.
Even if state agents make efforts to be sensitive to those concerns, a
negotiation between state officials and church leaders over the loca-
tion of an altar, or other liturgically significant features of interior de-
sign, would be an impermissible entanglement if ever one is to be
found. "6
184
 For discussion of the current exemption models used by legislatures and courts, see
supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
to Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 74-76,88-90.
I" Although our analysis does not depend on the history of religious and legal atti-
tudes about the interior of worship spaces, that history suggests that these spaces have for
thousands of years been thought to possess a special character. Many viewed the interior of
temples and churches as sacred and holy ground, and excluded the unclean from these
spaces. Moreover, the concept of sanctuary, though never respected in American law, rec-
ognized the interior of religious structures as embassy-like, territory foreign to the nation-
state in which the structures were located. State agents, pursuing state purposes, could be
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This analysis of the scope of regulatory power over religious insti-
tutions suggests a resolution to the dilemma of historic preservation
grants to such entities. Because the state has constitutionally sufficient
reasons to regulate the exterior of houses of worship, the state should
also be free to subsidize the preservation of these exteriors, including
religious symbols that constitute a part of such exteriors.'" Both regu-
lation and subsidy are justified by the public, secular purposes served
by historic preservation of the exteriors of religious structures.
In contrast, the state should be forbidden to subsidize what it
cannot regulate, because the subsidy will inevitably be accompanied
by regulatory conditions. The interiors of religious spaces undoubt-
edly possess great architectural, historical, and cultural significance,
but they are also the places in which the faith envelops believers in
the imagery and experience of reverence.'" Even if the religious insti-
tution consents to government regulation of the interior space, as a
condition of receiving a preservation grant, enforcement of such
conditions involves the same constitutional defect as direct regula-
tion. 139
 Although the government may solve that problem by provid-
ing grants for preservation of interiors without such conditions, unre-
stricted direct funding of religious entities raises different, and
perhaps even greater, constitutional problems. State expenditures re-
quire a public, secular purpose; without conditions that guarantee
excluded froin them, and fugitives from civil justice therefore could find refuge within
them. Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpre-
tation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 747, 749-767 (1986) (describing
history of religious and legal conception of sanctuary).
137
 Under the doctrine of compelled speech, a religious institution may be able to raise
a religion-neutral constitutional defense to some types of regulation of the exterior, but
the institution should also be free to waive that defense, and accept state regulation.
Whether the waiver can be questioned or withdrawn by successors in interest with respect
to the property presents a nice question, but not a religion-specific one. In contrast, a re-
ligious institution may not waive the Establishment Clause concerns implicated in regula-
tion of the interior of houses of worship.
136 If the state finances the preservation of interiors of houses of worship on the condi-
tion that the public be provided access to such spaces, there exists a possibility, however
remote, that the state is impermissibly steering public viewers into a religious experience.
Such steering presents Establishment Clause questions akin to those presented in much
stronger form by government-financed vouchers for purchase of services in religion-
infused settings. For discussion of the steering problem associated with vouchers, see Ira C.
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angie Look at Government Vouchers and
Sectarian Service Providers, J.L. & Pot- (forthcoming 2002).
139
 If the benefit of the preservation were held by a nongovernmental entity, the ques-
tion of enforcement of conditions involving the interior of worship spaces opens up
difficult constitutional questions about state action, of the sort initially addressed in Shel-
ley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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that the money will be used for such a purpose, state transfers to relig-
ious institutions are forbidden. 14°
Although it might seem solid, the boundary between interior and
exterior presents some challenging questions, best exemplified by the
dilemma of stained-glass windows."' Such windows may have great
historical or artistic significance, and make a substantial contribution
to the structure's external appearance. Such windows often present
religious themes, however, and help to shape the worship experience
through the play of light and imagery. Following our earlier mode of
analysis, we look first at the regulatory question. May the state require
a religious entity to preserve and maintain stained-glass windows that
convey religious themes and are visible from within the sanctuary? We
think the answer must be no. State control over the religious imagery
in a worship space involves the entanglement concerns that motivate
our basic judgment about state regulation of the interiors of houses of
worship. Thus, if the state may not regulate the windows because of
the religious imagery visible from within the worship space, the state
also may not pay for the preservation or maintenance of such win-
dows.
With respect to stained-glass windows that do not involve relig-
ious themes, regulation designed to preserve such windows presents a
closer constitutional question. On the one hand, the use of color in
such windows, and the ways in which they regulate the flow of light
into the worship space, may influence religious experience. This ar-
gument, however, may prove too much for our taste; by analogy, at
140
 Even the most avid supporters of Neutralism in Mitchell u Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000), adhere to this proposition. Id. at 807-08 (plurality opinion).
141 The question of whether government funds may be used to pay for structural re-
pairs, such as restoring a building's foundation or reinforcing a load-bearing wall, provides
another good example of the difficulty of distinguishing interior and exterior repairs. We
noted above that states have reached different answers to this question. See supra notes
122-123 and accompanying text. The Lieberman Letter suggests that government
financing is impermissible when it provides a benefit 'without which certain religious ac-
tivities could not continue." Lieberman Letter, supra note 71, at 15. We disagree with the
premise underlying Attorney General Lieberman's conclusion—that the extent of the
benefit conferred on the religious entity should be the measure of the financing's consti-
tutionality. Instead, we look to the legitimacy of the state's interest in the structure's pres-
ervation in that particular form. If the structural repairs go to the integrity of the build-
ing—that is, the continued safety and stability of the structure—the government's interest
seems little different in the case of a religious building than any other building. In such
cases, we believe that the government should be free to finance structural repairs of his-
toric religious properties. If the building's integrity is not at issue, and the repairs affect
only the interior of the space, then the constitutionality of the grant is much more doubt-
ful,
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least some exterior features, such as building height, may also
influence the experience of worshipers within. In our view, if the win-
dows do not portray religious themes, or are not visible from within
the worship space, the case for the constitutional permissibility of
state financing becomes considerably stronger.
CONCLUSION
Even if our intuitions about the constitutional status of historic
preservation grants meet with some disagreement—and we expect
that they will—we think that the context of historic preservation of
houses of worship provides a rich field for exploring fundamental
questions about the relationship between the state and religious insti-
tutions. Neither the strong Separationist solution, which would forbid
both regulation and subsidy of the historic character of houses of wor-
ship, nor the Neutralist's acceptance of regulation and subsidy of re-
ligious entities on equal terms with other institutions, tracks the cur-
rent trajectory of constitutional law. Moreover, neither view captures
the dual nature of religious institutions, perhaps best reflected in
their structures, which are at once the places in which the defining
activity of the faith occurs, and at the same time vital parts of a com-
munity's historical and cultural legacy.
